In 1720 the Ottoman ambassador Yirmisekiz Celebe Mehmed Effendi was dispatched to France with the aim of visiting “fortresses and factories, and to make a thorough study of means of civilization and education, and report on those suitable for application in the Ottoman Empire” (4). The embassy evolved into a historical instance of a non-colonial encounter between East and West, though paradoxically leading in the long run to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire by the hands of European powers.
East Encounters West: France and the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century, by Fatma Müge Goçek (Oxford UniversityPress, 1987) studies this embassy account, itssurrounding circumstances and its impact asexample of an encounter between “atraditional society and the rising West” (4),with the aim of providing new insights intocultural differences between societies and intothe nature of cultural transmission anddiffusion. The author provides throughhistorical re-construction of the embassyreports an interesting and detailed view of thedifferences between French and Ottomansocieties of the time. This is where thesignificance of the book lies, for it sheds light on a transitional episode -a missing linkbetweenthe times of Islamic Ottomanimperial societies acting as unifyingframework and the modern period whenEuropean colonizing powers began todismember the ‘sick man’ of Europe. Thematerial we read here captures the earliestsigns of Ottoman awareness and perceptionsof the West and their discovery of the shift inthe balance of power, as a result of theirrecent military defeats by Russia and Austriaand loss of control over the Mediterranean.
In other words, the realization ofOttoman territorial commercial regressionconstituted the initial motive force behind turning to the West for military andadministrative reform, yet the reports of Mehmed Effendi also reflected observeddifferences in culture and social lifestyles between the two societies. Not only theOttomans but also the rest of Europe looked to France as the leader of mosttransformations in art, architecture, and entertainment. At this point, however,Ottoman curiosity about France's strange customs, such as the sons of princes andnoblemen being the dancers in the king's court (42), remains a kind of neutral wonderthat emphasized apartness, but also secure non-bias. The Ottoman court behaved withmore reserve and gravity, out of respect for status. It will be noticed, for example, thatMehmed Effendi "rarely made explicit comparisons between the Ottoman and Frenchsocieties," (26) and hence avoided evaluations of foreign lifestyles vis-à-vis his homeculture. He was more interested in French political practices and the characteristics oftheir officials and administrative systems.In an interesting part of the book, the authorjuxtaposes two engravings of this period picturing reception ceremonies for French and Ottoman ambassadors, at the Sultan's and theFrench court respectively. One of thesignificant differences is the fact that theFrench ambassador and his retinue woreceremonial robes and hats like the Porte's officials, while Mehmed Effendi's large caftan and turban remained in striking contrast tothose of the French audience. The pictureepitomizes Ottoman reluctance towardscomplete, unmitigated assimilation of foreigninfluence, which ironically will swing to theother extreme of rigidly connecting reform toEuropeanization. As for the French side, thesedifferences in modes of dress inspired a brieffashion of "turquerie" during the reign of
Louis XV, a playful imitation of Turkish attire and decoration in paintings (72-73).
Both practices, however, are hegemonic, each in its own way: the French in letting the
Ottomans look "Turkish" were subjecting them to the European "curious" gaze, while the Ottomans' insistence on superficial assimilation of French officials actually bespeaks a more subtle message of inherent difference in status. Other drastic cultural differences revealed in Mehmed Effendi's reporting covered a wide spectrum from the boundaries between public and private spheres, to modes of entertainment and leisure activities, to the sense of space, and eating manners. The Ottomans especially divided public and private spheres and were shocked at any feature of disclosing living habits to public and social view. The luxury of a separate, specialized dining room had just evolved in France, and a meal was usually looked upon as a social event; it was noisy and pretentious, now that the noblemen needed twice as many servants in the kitchen and in the dining room. The Ottomans, on the other hand, had food served wherever the people were, usually in their living quarters, and ate privately and in silence and respect. When the French wanted to watch the Ottomans eat, the latters were shocked by this intrusion into their private lives. French curiosity amazed the Ottomans and showed how each party took great notice of the other's mode of living. Such narrated encounters between the two cultures reveal awareness of difference, but not infatuation.
It was only in the decades that followed the return of Mehmed Effendi's embassy and with the next generation represented by his son Mehmed Said that an impact began to be felt. The author observes that while the impact in France was a temporary fashion mode, in Ottoman society it initiated many long-term changes. Again, the historical evidence unearthed and compiled by Goçek constitutes her point of strength, yet one still craves for a larger dose of interpreting cultural repercussions in its various aspects, especially in relation to women's lives. In short, the Ottomans began imitating French architecture palace designs gardens, and consequently entertainment habits and consumption patterns—promoted especially by the highest officials of the Empire and its dignitaries. The desire to observe scientific and military development began to evolve throughout the rest of this century (18th) into an uncontrollable receptiveness towards luxury goods and its consumption through continuous imports, especially by the elites. The author gives a perceptive explanation of the situation when she reminds us that the Ottomans in their strength had the power to control and mold outside influences when they imitated products of other societies.
The Ottoman encounter with the French during the eighteenth century was initiated when the Ottomans had started to retreat militarily and technologically. The Ottomans were not strong enough to control and mold these impacts and the impacts started to mould.. them instead into a new synthesis. (80) In effect, what Goçek is saying is that cultural dominance is bound to power. Indeed the economic factor is not to be underrated. As for the single most important technological consequence of Mehmed Effendi's embassy, it was the founding of the first official Ottoman printing press by his son Mehmed Said--in 1726--with the assistance of Ibrahim Muteferrika, an advance of science and education. The operation of the press was easily possible because of the presence of Jewish, Greek, and Armenian printers in Constantinople who had been printing books in Hebrew and Greek. Yet, other than the press and brief failed attempts to reproduce and market successfully mechanical clocks and textiles, the Ottomans neglected the pursuit of more advanced technological means, and since they could not actively produce them, they could only consume them. This led to the most serious consequence of Western influence: the emergence of a division in Ottoman society between those oriented towards the West and those who vigorously rejected it. The author links the consumption of French products and the adoption of new tastes to the emergence of westernized customs and hence the creation of a "cultural dichotomy" for the first time among the Ottomans (81). Goçek does not elaborate, however, on those problem-ridden denominations: did progressive necessarily mean pro-Western and technologically modern? And did conservative mean rejection of modern scientific advancement?
In the meantime, French and other European commercial expansion in the Mediterranean and into the oceans continued to develop and force the Ottomans to give more trade privileges to foreigners in Egypt and Syria, which enabled Western goods, merchants, and travellers more penetration of Ottoman markets (101).
Besides the significant information that the book provides, the final lesson to be learned is that the pattern of changing Ottoman attitude towards the West and their growing receptivity to its influence (initially commenced by military and commercial overtaking), "can be compared to the experiences of other traditional societies with the West" (137). I felt a little uncomfortable with the continuous reference to the polarity of passive and receptive "tradition" versus strictly Western technology (as if that scientific development sprang up in the 18th century and had no roots in European Renaissance assimilation of Islamic scientific learning and its diffusion through Italian presses). Nonetheless I pondered over a few questions. Isn't this case a precursor to the situation of Egypt in early 19th century and the modernization process launched by Muhammad Ali? Did his project echo Sultan Selim III's (1789 - 1807) reform program of modern army corps and technical schools, as well as that of Sultan Mahmud II's (1807 - 1839) concept of a centralized state governed by an absolute monarch? Doesn't this relate to the debate among Egypt's historians over whether Muhammad Ali was operating within an Ottoman framework or was a liberator of
Egypt from Ottoman yoke?* Is this the real beginning of the false dichotomy between modernity or reform (the supposed domain of the West) and traditional 'mummified' cultures waiting to be acted upon? And finally: does modernization have to conflict with and antagonize tradition or necessitate cultural / historical rupture? East Encounters West piques one's interest to know more about the cultural and social ramifications of such instances in history; yet we hoped for more analysis of the interplay between military / economic retreat and cultural passivity. Though it examines only the case of the Ottomans in the 18th century, one can perceive an uncanny resemblance to conditions closer to home.
Omaima Abu Bakr
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*See Pascale Ghazaleh's review of All the Pasha's Men: Mohammed Ali, his army and the making of modern Egypt, by Kaled Fahmy (Cambridge University Press 1997), in Al-Ahram Weekly, 27 Aug.-
2 Sept. 1998.